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Rational Self-Sufficiency and Greek Ethics* 
Nicholas P. White
Greek though t has been a double source of ideas for m odern  ethics. On the one 
hand  it has been used as a conservative influence, providing confirm ation of 
curren t ethical views. At o ther times it has been asked to play a revisionary role, 
to run  counter to cu rren t ethical thinking. In recent times the latter tendency 
has been m uch the stronger. O ne im portan t instance was G. E. M. Anscom be’s 
“M odern Moral Philosophy,” in which she invoked Greek ethics, with its stress 
on the notion of virtue, against the prevailing Kantian em phasis on the idea of 
moral obligation.1 T h a t them e has reappeared  frequently since, in writings by 
Philippa Foot, A lasdair M acIntyre, B ernard  Williams, and others.2
The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, by 
M artha Nussbaum , is ano ther in this series o f appeals to the Greeks to help us 
tu rn  away from  m odern  and especially Kantian ethics. But although Nussbaum  
m entions the contrast between the ethics o f duty and the ethics o f virtue (e.g., 
p. 363), she focuses on o ther aspects of Greek ethical thinking. T hey revolve 
around  three main questions, concerning (1) “the role in the hum an good life 
o f activities and relationships that are, in their nature, especially vulnerable to 
reversal,” (2) the relationship am ong the individual com ponents o f the good life, 
w hether they “exist harm oniously, or are . . . capable, in circumstances not of 
the agent’s own making, of generating conflicting requirem ents that can themselves 
im pair the goodness o f the ag en t’s life,” and (3) “the relationship between self­
sufficiency and the m ore ungovernable parts o f the hum an being’s internal 
m akeup,” especially “the so-called ‘irrational parts o f the soul’ ” (pp. 6 -7 ) . She 
aims to show how some Greek thinkers, unlike Kant and his followers, understood 
and conceded the effects o f luck on the value of people and their lives. T he 
tragedians are said to have done this. Plato is said to have refused to gran t such 
a role to luck in his early and middle work, notably in the Republic, bu t to have 
changed his position to some extent in the Phaedrus. Aristotle is said to have 
returned to something like the tragedians’ attitude, working it out in an articulated 
methodology, philosophical psychology, and ethics (p. 8).
* A review of Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek 
Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. xvii+544, $59.50 
(cloth), $19.95 (paper).
1. G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 (1958): 1-19.
2. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, “Virtues and Vices,” in her Virtues and Vices (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 1-18; Alasdair MacIntyre, After 
Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); and Bernard Williams, 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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A num ber o f issues are linked by N ussbaum  with her questions about luck. 
O ne has to do with w hether there is a single scale of value on which all goods 
are m easurable. A nother has to do with w hether in ethical thinking we should 
rely only on “reason” (the view that she attributes mainly to Plato and Kant) or 
should also in some way use emotions. A nother concerns the relation of the 
aforem entioned issue to questions of style (e.g., w hether to write tragedy or 
Platonic dialogue or treatises). A nd the book deals with o ther m atters as well. 
Some are points o f straightforward philosophical exegesis in Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
ethics and psychology. O thers concern the in terpretation  o f three tragedies (Aes­
chylus’s Agamemnon, Sophocles’ Antigone, and Euripides’ Hecuba) and other matters 
which, though  they are perhaps not philosophical in a narrow  sense, N ussbaum  
rightly refuses to separate off from  the issues that are so.
T he book asks to be read as a philosophical account o f the concepts and 
argum ents used by the figures whom it examines. By “philosophical” I mean 
that it is not a general intellectual history or history of ideas, and it does not 
attem pt to place philosophical views within their general intellectual o r cultural 
context. A study attem pting  tha t would have to deal with various m atters that 
this book passes over, such as the so-called Sophistic movement and the connections 
between it and the ideas o f the tragedians, earlier Greek views of the soul and 
the self, and the influence o f ideas o f the polis— for example, loyalty to it, 
antipathy to it, am bivalence about it— on the thinkers whom she deals with. T he 
book does discuss some things that currently  are treated  mainly by people who 
think of themselves as studying literature ra the r than philosophy, and some of 
those discussions are o f interest independently  of their bearing on the book’s 
main philosophical them es. B ut clearly N ussbaum ’s purpose is first and forem ost 
to engage in an essentially analytical philosophical discussion of certain ideas 
that are present, she holds, in the writings of the tragedians, Plato, and Aristotle, 
and this is the aspect o f the book that I shall deal with here.
At the same time, it should be noted, the book does not claim to be a 
philosophical study o f the notion o f tyche in G reek philosophy or m ore generally 
in Greek thought. T here  is no general investigation of this notion (and related 
notions like aitia). A ristotle’s trea tm en t o f tyche in Physics 4, for exam ple, is only 
m entioned once. N or is there any general treatm ent o f tyche in Greek literature.
Most o f the philosophical them es tha t Nussbaum  uses are draw n from  ideas 
of B ernard  Williams. O ne is his idea, expressed in his essay “Moral Luck” and 
elsewhere, tha t the evaluation of a person’s choices, character, and life depends, 
in a way that he takes the Kantian outlook to deny that it does, on happenings 
outside the person’s control.3 Williams m aintains that although “a sense of expo­
sure to fo rtune is expressed . . .  in Greek literature, above all in tragedy,” the 
Greek philosophers, unlike the tragedians, mistakenly agreed with K ant that 
“what is o f highest value, what m atters most, should be entirely under the se lf’s 
control.” Nussbaum accepts this as a charge against Plato (with the partial exception 
of the Phaedrus). B ut Aristotle seems to her (as he did to a m uch lesser extent 
to Williams) to escape the indictm ent.4 T he dom inant issue, though, is the extent
3. See Bernard Williams, “Moral Luck,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50, suppl. 
(1976): 115-35, reprinted in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981). See more recently his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.
4. Bernard Williams, “Philosophy,” in The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal, ed. M. I. 
Finley (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), pp. 202-55; see esp. pp. 252-53 and, on Aristotle, 
pp. 249-50.
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to which luck can affect the value or values o f a person’s character and life. For 
the same reasons as Williams, N ussbaum  regards it as plain that luck can affect 
these things to a very great extent, and her project is then to see which o f the 
Greeks realized this fact and in what ways.
Williams’s main concern was o f course not to describe Greek ethics, bu t to 
criticize K antian and o ther m odern  views. His own accounts of the role o f luck 
in Greek ethics are casual. O ne o f them , a section of a dozen pages (see n. 3), 
is cursory and popular. T h e  other, scattered here and there th roughou t his recent 
book, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy (see n. 2), is tangential to his discussion 
of m odern  ethics and never aims at thoroughness. T here  can be no doubt that 
his discussion is directly relevant to Kantian and post-Kantian ethical philosophy. 
A lthough there may be room  to dispute his in terpretation  of Kant, it is certainly 
a plausible one, since Kant does often seem to hold tha t the hum an rational self 
is in some sense outside o f the natural world, and that what goes on there leaves 
the genuine value, that is, the m oral value, o f a person completely unaffected.
But although Williams does not aim to give a scholarly treatm ent o f Greek 
ethics, he m aintains tha t we see am ong the Greek philosophers the same “sus­
tained pursu it o f rational self-sufficiency” that he attributes to Kantian m oralists.5 
T he scrutiny of this contention is the task that N ussbaum  takes on herself. “This 
book,” she writes, “will be an exam ination of the aspiration to rational self­
sufficiency in Greek ethical thought: the aspiration to make the goodness of a 
good hum an life safe from  luck th rough  the controlling power o f reason” (p. 3). 
She speaks of “the Platonic conception o f a self-sufficient and purely rational 
being,” and Plato’s “aspiration to purity and to freedom  from  luck” (pp. 5 -6 ) . 
B ut although Plato is the only Greek philosopher whom she regards as having 
fully jo ined  the “pursu it o f rational self-sufficiency,” she m aintains that both the 
tragedians and Aristotle understood the force o f that aim, even though  they 
believed that it was m isguided (see, e.g., pp. 8 -9 ).
It would certainly be worthwhile, and not at all trivial, to show that the 
ethical problem s tha t Williams develops in his criticism of Kantian ethics are in 
fact p resen t in the writings o f those who express themselves in such different 
term s from  K ant as the Greeks do. Not only are Williams’s views stimulating, 
bu t trying to see their place in Greek though t would also encourage us to clarify 
and deepen  o u r understanding  o f what exactly is involved in such notions as 
luck and rational self-sufficiency as we try to ascertain w hether the Greeks were 
in fact talking about the same things that Williams has in mind.
According to Nussbaum , Plato shows an aspiration to rational self-sufficiency 
in the Protagoras (chap. 4). As is well known, Plato here com pares deliberation 
about fu tu re  action to a calculation of fu tu re  pleasure. Nussbaum  comes to the 
conclusion that this conception of deliberation is developed as a way of systematizing 
our judgm ents so as to keep us from  “being at the mercy of what happens” (pp. 
99, 109). For one thing, she holds, this conception o f deliberation involves (as 
others have pointed out)6 regarding all values as m easurable on a single scale, 
which Plato here takes to be a hedonic scale. By rejecting the “heterogeneity” of 
goods, she says, this view works against “a necessary condition for the development 
o f irrational m otivations” (pp. 116-17), and thus “modifies ou r irrational m o­
5. Ibid., p. 253.
6. See, e.g., Donald J. Zeyl, “Socrates and Hedonism in Plato’s Protagoras 351b-358d,” 
Phronesis 25 (1980): 259-60.
tivations, to the extent to which akrasia will no longer occur” (p. 121). This, she 
maintains, serves “o u r am bition to be in control o f our p lanning th rough  a 
deliberative techne” (p. 119). In  this way, Plato em erges as responding to an “acute 
sense o f the problem s caused by ungoverned luck in hum an life” (p. 90) and as 
wishing to com plete “a story o f gradually increasing hum an control over contin­
gency” (p. 91).
T h ere  is evident confusion in this account of what Plato is doing in the 
Protagoras. His claim there is that no one who believes A  to be, all things considered, 
the better course than  B  can ever freely do B instead under the influence of 
some em otion or the like, in particular the attractive pleasantness o f B (358b - 
d). This does not shield anyone from  any contingencies. It tells you tha t if you 
are doing som ething freely, then  it m ust be what you believe to be best, all things 
considered. B ut it in no way denies that you can be subject to capricious changes 
of belief about what is best, caused by whatever contingencies, external or internal, 
you care to m ention. All that it guarantees is that i f  som ething changes your 
decision about what to do from  what it was two m inutes ago, that will count, in 
Plato’s view, as a change in your belief about what is best, not as a change in 
some em otion working against it.
In view of this fact it is not surprising that the Protagoras does not claim to 
be providing, in the claim of the hom ogeneity o f goods, any new or better m ethod 
of deliberation, let alone a better means o f dealing with luck. As is well known, 
Plato claims that m easuring pleasures and pains is the way in which people 
actually do deliberate; and  no one, Plato says here, ever does go against his or 
h er better judgm ent. T he only proposal that he makes is that we should m easure 
accurately ra the r than  inaccurately. Nussbaum  gives no reason for thinking that 
Plato otherwise means to be presenting a proposal about how we should deliberate 
ra the r than  a description o f how we do deliberate, which is what he says he is 
giving. H er account o f how that proposal m ight serve to safeguard us from  
“being at the mercy o f what happens” is inadequate in the obvious way ju s t 
described, and, since this is so, her in terpretation  of the Protagoras is left quite 
unsupported . Perhaps there is some way o f defending the interpretation , bu t it 
is not to be found here.
N ussbaum ’s next chapter, on the Republic, also tries to see Plato aim ing for 
rational self-sufficiency. N ussbaum  recognizes that in Plato’s view, the good, as 
represen ted  by the Platonic Form of the Good, is held to be good intrinsically, 
in the strong sense that its goodness is independen t o f any relation either to 
su rround ing  circum stances— good unqualifiedly, as G. E. L. Owen pu t it7— or 
to desires o f any being for it. In  this being a notion o f what is good of its own 
nature and regardless o f any relation to anything else, Plato’s view of the good 
is quite similar, as is well known, to the view expressed by G. E. M oore in Principia 
Ethica, which was o f course directly influenced by Plato. T he notion of intrinsic 
goodness in question is o f course a good deal stronger than the one usually 
expressed by that phrase in recent ethics, in which it is contrasted merely with 
instrum ental goodness (the relevant distinctions have been well explained by 
Christine K orsgaard).8
7. G. E. L. Owen, “A Proof in the Peri Ideon,” Journal of Hellenic Studies, pt. 1 (1957), 
pp. 103-11, reprinted in G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic, ed. Martha Nussbaum 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 165 — 79.
8. Christine Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 
169-95.
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N ussbaum  tries to connect these Platonic views about goodness to her them e 
o f the aspiration to rational self-sufficiency and im m unity to luck. She holds that 
in Plato’s view the activities that are genuinely good, notably philosophical thinking, 
must themselves be good independently  of circumstances and desires or needs 
for them (pp. 143-44, 147). H ere she contends that because philosophical thinking 
is good in a way independen t of being desired or needed, its goodness m ust be 
recognized from  a point o f view dissociated from  “hu m an ” needs, particularly 
those connected with the body (pp. 154-55), or from  what she also calls a “pure 
viewpoint o f needlessness” (p. 156). (Nussbaum here shifts casually from  speaking 
of a point o f view independent o f “h u m an ” needs, including bodily ones, to 
speaking o f a point of view o f com plete “needlessness,” which is plainly quite 
ano ther m atter.) She also links this claim, in a way that she leaves quite unclear, 
with the idea that the best activities m ust be “stable,” in being capable of being 
continued indefinitely and in being independent o f contingent circumstances in 
the world (pp. 147-49). T h at the Forms are unchanging, she says, helps support 
the view that philosophical thought is itself “maximally stable, unvarying, and 
contex t-independent” (p. 149). In this way she comes to the conclusion that the 
Republic represents an attem pt by Plato to help us escape “the pain and instability 
o f our em pirical lives” (p. 161), an attem pt that is later criticized by Plato him self 
in the Phaedrus (pp. 222—23, 230) and later by Aristotle (e.g., pp. 319, 322, 381).
Ju lia  Annas has urged that the Republic does try to show that a person’s 
happiness is in im portan t ways less dependen t on external circumstances than 
com m on sense m ight suppose.9 But to see w hether Plato does it in the way that 
N ussbaum  maintains, several things need to be m ade clear. Suppose it is agreed, 
for the sake o f argum ent, that the goodness of philosophical thinking is not 
dependen t on any desire for it o r pleasure taken in it by hum an beings. It should 
be plain that this has nothing to do with the issue of im m unity to luck that is 
N ussbaum ’s main them e. T o  figure in a response to that issue, the activity of 
philosophical thinking would have to possess stability in the sense of what m ight 
be called “unlosability,” the property  o f being such that when you have it, your 
chances of being deprived of it are low. Being intrinsically good in Plato’s sense 
is quite a d ifferent thing. It is simply a m atter o f being good in no m atter what 
circumstances and apart from  being desired or needed. It is true that if som ething 
is intrinsically good in this sense then its being good will not depend on circumstances 
that m ight change. But this goes hardly anyw here toward showing that it is 
unlosable, since it merely excludes its ceasing to be good by virtue of changing 
circumstances and does not exclude its being lost.
To see the point clearly, consider the case of philosophical thinking. Assume, 
as agreed, that it is good in no m atter what circumstances, and that it is good 
apart from  anyone’s desiring it. All o f that is com patible with its being as fragile 
as you like. O r suppose that providing food to the hungry  is good u nder no 
m atter what circumstances and apart from  anyone desiring to do it. T h at would 
not prevent its being som ething whose continuation is at the whim of fortune. 
Nussbaum’s discussion obscures this fact through its confused notion of “stability,” 
which combines the two notions in an unargued  way so as to make it appear 
that a necessary connection between the two of them holds. But a little examination
9. Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), chap. 6, 
esp. pp. 167-69 and pp. 314-18.
of that com bination would have shown how poorly suited it is to her purposes. 
Intrinsic goods are one thing; unlosable goods are quite another.
Once one notices this distinction, one sees that there is little reason to agree 
that in Plato’s view philosophical though t is always m ore resistant to unlucky 
contingencies than o ther hum an activities are. A person who is contem plating 
the Forms m ight be said to be self-sufficient in the sense of not then needing to 
do anything else, and m ight be free of the worry that the objects of his thought 
m ight change or cease to exist. B ut Plato makes it abundantly  clear, in passages 
whose relevance N ussbaum  seems not to heed, that philosophical contem plation 
is often a very fragile activity indeed. Not only is the Republic full o f warnings 
about how difficult the ap titude for philosophy is to develop, so that an elaborate 
educational scheme is necessary to n u rtu re  it, but Plato also em phasizes that 
even one who has become a philosopher needs to guard  against influences that 
m ight lead him away from  it (e.g., 496a-497a), including even the witnessing 
of tragic perform ances, which, Plato says, are able “to co rrup t even good men, 
with very few exceptions” (605c).
In the light o f these facts, ano ther basic confusion in N ussbaum ’s line of 
though t becomes evident. Having seized on the vague observation that both K ant 
and Plato believe in some sort of radical separation of the reason and the body, 
she fails to consider the differences between the two kinds of separation involved. 
In Plato’s view, the reason is closely bound  up causally with the body. Obviously 
he thinks that the reason can affect the body by deciding what is best to do and, 
if conditions are right, getting the body to do it. Equally obviously, the body is 
able in many ways to affect, usually for the worse, the operation of the reason. 
It is perfectly true  that in some respects the reason rem ains im m une to bodily 
influence. For exam ple, the reason supposedly cannot be destroyed by external 
influences, and it does not lose its capacity for true cognition (518c-d). But 
w hether one’s reason correctly exercises this capacity in its judgm ents about what 
is best is strongly influenced by one’s body and by o ther factors, such as educa­
tion .10 Plato is thus what m ight be called a reason-body interactionist, as Descartes 
was a m ind-body interactionist. K an t’s view— w hatever exactly it am ounts to — 
is clearly different. O n it, even practical reason can apparently  be though t o f as 
unaffected by the physical or phenom enal world, so that the influences of that 
world somehow bypass it; and its goodness can be thought o f as a function of 
its own intrinsic condition and not also of factors working on it from  outside. 
This, of course, is why K ant has to insist that when we think of things in this 
way, we have to deny that determinism holds. Plato, on the other hand, notoriously 
pays no attention in these contexts to issues of determ inism  and is unconcerned 
with questions about w hether the person, apart from  surrounding  factors, is 
responsible (“m orally” responsible, in our sense) for good or bad actions.
All o f this calls into question, o f course, Williams’s assimilation o f Plato’s 
outlook to K an t’s. N othing crucial in W illiams’s philosophical project hinges on 
the assimilation, as I have said, and he makes it casually and w ithout much 
argum ent for its historical accuracy. H e places some weight on our inform ation 
that Socrates held tha t “the good m an cannot be harm ed ,” which Williams in­
terprets, along with o ther evidence of a general Socratic asceticism, as m eaning
10. Therefore if we are willing to call “physical” anything that is capable of causally 
affecting and being affected by obviously physical things, it is quite wrong to say that the 
Platonic soul is nonphysical, though of course it is in some sense nonmaterial.
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that “the only thing that could touch him [Williams’s emphasis] would be something 
that could touch, not his body [my emphasis], but the good state o f his soul, and 
that is inviolable [my em phasis].”11 Williams presum ably has in m ind Apology 4 Id, 
where Socrates is m ade to say that “there is nothing bad [or, perhaps, harm ful, 
kakon] for a good m an either living or dead, nor are the gods unm indful of his 
affairs.” Bits o f testim ony about Socrates (if that is what this is) are often difficult 
to in terpret, and this one seems especially so. It might, after all, be nothing m ore 
than an expression of faith that the gods will keep the good safe from  harm  (cf., 
e.g., Republic 613a). T he picture is not unam biguous.
A nother issue that N ussbaum  thinks can be used to focus on the Greek 
aspiration to rational self-sufficiency is the question w hether there is a single 
scale of value by which all goods can be measured. H er picture of the philosophical 
issue again begins mainly from  the views of W illiams.12 She follows the view, 
standard  am ong philosophers (though some readers o f the Agamemnon, e.g., will 
question w hether it is as clearly true of that play as Nussbaum  thinks), that tragedy 
exhibits “tragic conflicts,” in which d ifferent values clash that are in some sense 
incom m ensurable. (Though the m atter is too com plex to be explored fully here, 
I should m ention that her account o f these conflicts is somewhat unfocused as 
to the differences between different com m on ways of taking them : sometimes, 
as on p. 34, she talks as if there is a choice that is correct even though it entails 
a m oral loss th rough  not having m ade the o ther choice, whereas at o ther times, 
as on pp. 49—50, 434—35, she writes as if there is no saying that either choice 
is correct.) She also follows the standard  view of Plato as having believed in a 
single standard  of goodness, represen ted  by the Form of the Good, by which 
seem ing conflicts o f value can all be rationally resolved. And she follows the 
equally standard  view of Aristotle as having rejected Plato’s evaluative monism 
in favor of the view that “the good is said in many ways” (Nicomachean Ethics 
1196a23 ff.) and that there is a notion of “hum an good” which, ra ther than  a 
general notion of goodness, should be used to evaluate hum an aims and actions 
(see esp. Nicomachean Ethics 1.6). T he outline of this tripartite story is familiar. 
N ussbaum ’s effort to go beyond it consists prim arily in h er attem pt to show that 
these figures’ respective views on this issue reflect in a significant way their 
positions on her central problem  of vulnerability to luck.
N ussbaum  never fully articulates the connection between the m atter o f in ­
com m ensurability and the m atter o f luck. She says that if one shows the force 
of the tragic view, that there are in some sense conflicts of incom m ensurables, 
then one shows “the fragility . . .  o f a part of . . . moral goodness itself” (p. 30). 
This could ju s t m ean that since there is no single scale o f goodness, there is no 
possibility o f a com plete decision procedure for guiding action. But Nussbaum  
seems to wish to go further. She suggests that the existence of incom m ensurable 
values may th reaten  the conviction that “the recalcitrant features of the world 
can be m astered by practical ethical rationality” (p. 60). T here seems to be a pun 
here on the word “m astered .” T he lack of a com plete decision procedure for 
telling what is best, and of a com plete set of facts about what is best (Nussbaum 
is unclear about which she has in m ind, though perhaps it is both), is an obstacle 
to, precisely, “m astering” a way of answering all questions about what is best.
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11. Williams, “Philosophy,” p. 249.
12. See Nussbaum, pp. 29-30; and Williams, “Moral Luck.”
But it is no obstacle to “m astering” the world in the sense of controlling it. A 
failure to attend  to this distinction leaves N ussbaum ’s position unfocused. Being 
unable to decide what to do is not the same as being unable to do som ething 
once you have decided to do it, even though  superficially similar feelings of 
helplessness may attend  both  sorts o f inability.
N ussbaum  does suggest (pp. 4 7 -4 9 ) one way in which the existence of cases 
in which incommensurable values actually come into conflict is a m atter of accidental 
contingency. Even though  it m ight be noncontingent that (as we may suppose, 
for example) the value of burying your dead b ro ther is incom m ensurable with 
the value o f defending  your city-state, nevertheless it is contingent that there 
ever are cases, or that on a particular occasion there is a case, in which a person 
can do one or the o ther bu t not both. This is perfectly true. But this difficulty 
needs to be sharply distinguished from  any problem  about controlling the course 
o f events in the world.
M oreover this issue does not appear to have m uch to do with the question 
w hether the goodness o f a person depends on contingencies outside of the self. 
A lthough Kant seems to have believed tha t there are no genuine conflicts of 
duty, he was certainly not forced to that belief by his doctrine that the only 
genuine value is independen t of contingencies. For he could have m aintained 
that doctrine and still held that when a person is confronted  with a genuine 
conflict o f m oral incom m ensurables, the goodness o f his or her will is unaffected 
by m aking one choice or the other, so long as the decision is made in full 
consciousness of the existence o f both obligations (which is not far from  what 
Nussbaum herself seems to maintain). Nussbaum seems to have taken “the Kantian 
position” as a monolithic whole, w ithout considering the possibility that parts of 
it m ight be separable from  each o ther in a way that would affect h er whole 
conception o f her project.
T here  is a fu rth e r difficulty. At several junc tu res (e.g., pp. 117, 220, 362), 
Nussbaum  w ithout argum ent associates the problem  of the incom m ensurability 
o f goods with a problem  about w hether the objects of attachm ent or desire are 
in some sense irreducibly particular. She finds Aristotle holding that they often 
are, and she finds Plato tending (except in the Phaedrus) to deny it. This issue 
o f “particularity” cannot be explored here, bu t one should note that its connection 
with the incommensurability of goods is far more complex than Nussbaum registers.
Even though  it is independen t o f the issue of luck, the issue of obstacles to 
straightforw ard evaluation is extrem ely im portan t in the com parison of the tra ­
gedians, Plato, and Aristotle. It is therefore unfo rtunate  that N ussbaum  simply 
does not discuss in any substantial way the one passage where Plato explicitly 
discusses and criticizes the tragic writers, namely, the first part of book 10 of the 
Republic. For here he says som ething directly both about how we should react to 
m isfortune {tychas, 605d3) and about the tragedians’ treatm ent of the evaluation 
of courses of action. As is well known, he urges us not to react to critical situations 
simply by em otion. He also insists that when we encounter such situations, we 
should decide what is the best thing to do not simply on the basis o f em otion 
bu t instead by some calculation o f what will bring the most good (604b-d). And 
I think it is clear that he is criticizing the tragedians for encouraging us to believe 
that, in such im portan t cases, there simply is no answer to the question o f what 
is the best th ing to do. At any rate, it is certainly strange and regrettable that 
Nussbaum  says almost nothing about this passage, which at least shows how Plato 
him self wished to present his disagreem ents with the tragedians.
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I have spent so m uch time on Plato because he plays the role of a quasi- 
Kantian antagonist in Williams’s and  N ussbaum ’s dram a of Greek ethics, and so 
it seem ed im portan t to see w hether he is really right for the part, and w hether 
the issues in which he is involved are the ones that Nussbaum  takes them  to be. 
But it is o f course equally im portan t to see w hether Aristotle is really a suitable 
protagonist (Williams takes him as a modified antagonist) who opposes Plato on 
Nussbaum’s “central question,” namely, “How far is hum an good living, eudaimonia, 
vulnerable?” (p. 318).
No one will deny that Aristotle allows that certain things are intrinsic goods 
that Plato regarded  either as only instrum entally good or else instrum entally or 
intrinsically harm ful. As Nicomacheart Ethics 1.6 makes clear, and as is generally 
recognized, this is largely because Aristotle attem pts to describe what he calls 
the “good for m an ,” which he thinks is possible w ithout somehow deriving it 
from  a m ore general notion of “the good itself” or the Form of the Good. 
M oreover, as is also generally recognized, these goods that Aristotle recognizes 
are things whose possession by a person are, for various reasons, subject to 
contingencies. Nussbaum  constructs an opposing “K antian” in terpretation  of 
Aristotle, which takes him to hold that eudaimonia is im m une to contingencies, 
such as those that befell Priam (p. 329). She cites Joachim  and Ross (pp. 329; 
495, n, 23), but if one looks at the passages cited one sees that Joachim ’s in te r­
pretation is Kantian only in the most d iluted way, and Ross’s is not so at all. In 
fact, Kantian in terpreters o f A ristotle’s ethics are vanishingly few, and they have 
had no influence at all in recent times.
Nussbaum  goes further, however, and holds that Aristotle was explicitly 
attacking the view tha t “the good hum an life is com pletely invulnerable to tyche” 
(p. 322; cf. p. 238), and that in certain passages “his prim ary point is to show 
us that w hatever is fulfillm ent of activity is also, therefore, vulnerable” (p. 326). 
His target is said to be mainly Plato, but when Plato cannot (even by her lights) 
serve as target, N ussbaum  suddenly presents some m ore opponents, notably one 
called the “good-condition theorist” (pp. 319 ff.; 493, n. 5; 495, n. 21). She says 
that she cannot identify these opponents, but in an extremely strange twist of 
the plot she suggests that because they sound like Stoics, people holding Stoic­
like views m ust have been active in Aristotle’s time (p. 494, n. 5). W hat Nussbaum  
never presents, however, is convincing evidence that Aristotle took such a view 
as his opposition, o r that he ever focused m uch attention on this issue of tyche.
W hat replaces such evidence in her accounts is a set o f indications, entirely 
uncontroversial, that Aristotle makes room , in both his ethics and his psychology, 
for values that are dependen t on contingencies and the existence of various 
norm al hum an desires. N ussbaum  often presents these indications as evidence 
that Aristotle was particularly concerned to show that hum an goods are fragile, 
against opponents holding that they are not. But of course they show no such 
thing.
Indeed, N ussbaum  seems to go yet fu rth e r and ascribe to Aristotle the 
additional Williams-like view tha t the very fragility of hum an goods is, at least 
in some cases, part o f what makes them  so valuable (pp. 3 1 8 -1 9 , 341, 387, 421). 
At least, this seems to be her intent, though she does not always distinguish the 
thesis tha t (i) certain hum an goods are fragile and the thesis that (ii) fragility is 
(part of) what makes certain things good for hum an beings. In any case, I do 
not see that she provides any evidence that Aristotle holds ii, and it often looks
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as though she takes evidence for i to be in itself evidence for ii, which it plainly 
is not.
Many readers of Aristotle will think that Nussbaum  is unable to do justice 
to Ethics 10.6—8, where Aristotle seems to end up saying that the life of philosophical 
contem plation, o r as m uch of it as possible, is the best life for a hum an being. 
Many in terpreters, wishing to distinguish Aristotle from  Plato far m ore sharply 
than these chapters seem to allow, have tried to show that they do not represen t 
A ristotle’s m ature or true position. Nussbaum  follows the same line, suggesting 
that although the chapters show Aristotle tem pted by a Platonic stance, they are 
a “fragm ent” not in tended to be part of the Ethics and do not represen t A ristotle’s 
fixed opinion (p. 377). I am skeptical o f this type of interpretation, but it is easy 
to sympathize with N ussbaum  here, since so many com m entators have found 
this passage awkward. W hat is startling is that the appendix in which she discusses 
the passage deals so cursorily with the im portan t objections to her view that it 
raises (pp. 3 7 3 -77 ), and that the appendix  was added only as an afterthought 
(p. 500, n. 3).
M oreover, even if these chapters do not belong in this spot in the Ethics, 
they are a sign of an underlying difficulty that surfaces elsewhere in A ristotle’s 
ethical works, but which Nussbaum  does not come to grips with, even though it 
affects her main them e. Plato, we know, believed in a single scale o f value, and 
Aristotle is typically taken to have disagreed with him. Nussbaum thinks that he 
refused to accept some single standard  of value whereby the life of a good hum an 
being could be ranked as less good than a life o f pure philosophic thought or 
some o ther idealized condition (p. 374). On this view there is “a good life for a 
hum an being,” and (say) “a good life for a god,” but no way of com paring them  
or ranking the latter better than the form er (p. 374).
T he trouble is, though, that as Nussbaum  notes (pp. 373 -74 ), Aristotle 
sometimes does com pare the values of these two sorts of lives, to the detrim ent 
o f the hum an life, and he does this not ju s t in Ethics 10.6—8 but elsewhere as 
well (e.g., Metaphysics 12.7, 9, where the argum ent depends on the com parison’s 
being made). Nussbaum  recognizes that there would be a difficulty in holding 
both that the com parison cannot be m ade and that it can be (pp. 374 -75 ). But 
as I have ju s t indicated, she seems to think that the difficulty can be avoided 
simply by relegating Ethics 1 0 .6 -8  to the status o f a “fragm ent.” In fact, however, 
the problem  really requires us to look m uch m ore carefully than Nussbaum  does 
at A ristotle’s whole notion of goodness. For although he wants to insulate the 
best hum an life from  certain kinds of com parisons with lives o f o ther beings, at 
the same time he really does seem to want to say that in one sense a life o f 
ordinary activity and m oral virtue is the best life that a hum an being can aspire 
to, and that in ano ther sense a hum an being, or a part of a hum an being, can 
aspire to a better life, namely, the life o f theoretical rational activity. W hat exactly 
his view is, and w hether it is coherent, are m ajor questions for students o f his 
work to answer. But his position is m uch m ore com plicated than can be handled 
in the few pages that N ussbaum  gives to it (pp. 373 -77 ), or than is suggested 
by the simple statem ent that he will not countenance this com parison of lives of 
hum ans and superhum an beings. Clearly he is doing m ore than simply either 
rejecting Plato’s single scale of value, or insulating a life involving norm al hum an 
desires, with their a ttendan t risks, from  an unfavorable com parison with a life 
of some m ore self-sufficient kind. In the com plex enterprise that makes up
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Aristotle’s investigation into various kinds of goods, the anti-Kantian project that 
Nussbaum  constructs for him  hardly seems to have a role.
But in spite o f all tha t I have said, an account similar to Williams’s o f what 
is at issue in G reek ethics m ight tu rn  out to be correct. In spite o f my many 
misgivings about it, I do not by any m eans rule out the possibility that, with care 
and an understanding  of the relevant issues, a good and interesting case for it 
m ight be made.
T he prim ary cause for concern about The Fragility o f Goodness, then, is not 
that its basic theses are wrong. Rather, the cause for concern is the low level of 
the treatm ent o f those theses and o f the notions involved in them . I have not 
had space to discuss by any means all o f the matters with which the book deals— 
or even o f the m atters that are philosophical in a narrow  sense. (For example, 
I have had to pass over N ussbaum ’s views on Aristotle’s m ethodology and its 
relation to Plato’s and the tragedians’ views, her views on their respective styles, 
her views on the in terpretation  of the Phaedrus, and her views on the role of 
em otion vis-a-vis reason in arriving at ethical judgm ents, am ong o ther things.) 
I have, however, discussed the prim ary line o f thought, and I do not think that 
the level o f philosophical discussion of o ther them es is higher. Some readers will 
lack the opportun ity  or the inclination o r the ability to exam ine the book in light 
o f both a knowledge o f the texts and secondary works and an awareness o f the 
philosophical issues involved. O thers, however, will be able to recognize that 
confusions and failures o f form ulation and analysis, far from  being small or 
peripheral to the aims of the book, subvert virtually every one o f its discussions. 
In  spite o f its confident tone, I have not found a single substantial issue in the 
book that seem ed to me to be, even by fairly relaxed standards, adequately 
form ulated. It would not have been an arduous task to think th rough , at least 
to some extent, the problem s confronting an application o f Williams’s them es 
to the history o f Greek ethics. (It m ight even have led to an awareness o f a m ore 
fruitful field o f application for those them es, namely, to Hellenistic ethics, since 
the Stoics, the Epicureans, and even the Skeptics show far m ore signs o f being 
explicitly concerned with problem s o f fragility than do Plato and Aristotle.) T he 
first part o f the task would have been an attem pt to form ulate clearly ju s t what 
the issues concerning fragility and self-sufficiency are, and the second part would 
have been a clear-sighted attem pt to see which o f them  are in fact exam ined in 
the texts and  how they are treated. But as the book is, unfortunately, the second 
part could not be carried out because the first part was scarcely begun.
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